INTERPOL and Global Law Enforcement

INTERPOL and global law enforcement examines how the worlds largest international police body coordinates cross-border crime investigations. The International Criminal Police Organization—known universally as INTERPOL—is the worlds largest international police organization, connecting law enforcement agencies in 195 member countries through a secure communications network, a suite of operational databases, and coordination mechanisms that enable police forces to share information, issue alerts, and conduct joint operations across national borders. INTERPOL does not conduct investigations or make arrests itself; rather, it serves as a platform through which national police forces cooperate on cases that cross jurisdictional boundaries—from fugitive location and extradition to counterterrorism, cybercrime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, and financial crime. This article, part of the Comparative Criminology section of the broader Criminology resource, examines INTERPOL’s institutional structure, operational capabilities, and contributions to international law enforcement, and evaluates the challenges and criticisms that the organization faces in an era of expanding transnational crime.

Introduction

INTERPOL was established in 1923 as the International Criminal Police Commission and reorganized under its current constitution in 1956. Headquartered in Lyon, France, with regional bureaus in Buenos Aires, Abidjan, Nairobi, and Singapore and a Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore, the organization provides a range of services designed to support member countries’ police forces in combating transnational crime. These services include the operation of global databases on stolen and lost travel documents, stolen vehicles, fingerprints, DNA profiles, facial recognition data, and firearms; the issuance of international notices (including Red Notices requesting the provisional arrest of wanted persons); the coordination of multinational operations targeting specific crime types; and the provision of training and capacity-building programs for law enforcement agencies in developing countries (Barnett & Coleman, 2005).

INTERPOL’s significance in the architecture of global law enforcement cooperation is difficult to overstate. No other organization provides a comparable platform for police-to-police communication and coordination across virtually every country in the world. Its databases are accessed millions of times per day by border control officers, police investigators, and immigration officials worldwide, and its notices system provides the closest equivalent to an international arrest warrant that exists in the absence of a global police force. At the same time, INTERPOL operates within constraints that limit its effectiveness: it has no enforcement powers of its own, it depends entirely on the willingness of member states to share information and act on requests, and its governance structure gives equal representation to countries with very different standards of rule of law and human rights (Deflem, 2006).

Institutional Structure and Governance

Organizational Architecture

INTERPOL’s governance is structured around four principal organs: the General Assembly, the Executive Committee, the General Secretariat, and the National Central Bureaus (NCBs). The General Assembly, comprising representatives of all 195 member countries, meets annually to set policy, approve the budget, and elect the Executive Committee and the Secretary General. The Executive Committee, composed of 13 members elected by the General Assembly on a regional basis, provides strategic direction between Assembly sessions. The General Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General, manages the organization’s day-to-day operations, maintains its databases and communications systems, and coordinates operational activities (Anderson, 1989).

National Central Bureaus serve as the primary interface between INTERPOL and member countries’ domestic law enforcement agencies. Each member country designates an NCB—typically housed within the national police or interior ministry—that serves as the single point of contact for all communications with INTERPOL and with NCBs in other countries. The NCB system ensures that requests for cooperation are channeled through authorized national authorities rather than between individual police officers, providing a measure of institutional control over international police communications. The quality and responsiveness of NCBs vary significantly across countries, reflecting differences in institutional capacity, political priorities, and the importance that national governments attach to international police cooperation (Barnett & Coleman, 2005).

INTERPOL’s budget—approximately €170 million annually—is modest relative to the scope of its mandate. Funding comes from member country contributions, which are assessed on a scale based on economic capacity, and from external sources including grants, partnerships with international organizations, and contributions from the private sector. The organization’s financial constraints limit its capacity to invest in technological infrastructure, expand its operational programs, and maintain the staffing levels necessary to address the growing volume and complexity of transnational crime. Budget discussions within the General Assembly reflect tensions between wealthy member states that contribute the largest shares and developing countries that depend most heavily on INTERPOL’s capacity-building services (Deflem, 2006).

Governance Challenges and Reform

INTERPOL’s inclusive membership—which encompasses democracies, authoritarian regimes, and countries with widely varying standards of rule of law—creates governance challenges that have attracted growing scrutiny. The organization’s constitution prohibits involvement in cases of a political, military, religious, or racial character, a provision intended to prevent the misuse of INTERPOL’s cooperation mechanisms for political persecution. However, the application of this prohibition has been inconsistent, and human rights organizations have documented cases in which authoritarian regimes have used INTERPOL’s Red Notice and diffusion systems to pursue political opponents, journalists, and activists who have fled abroad (Fair Trials International, 2018).

Reform efforts have focused on strengthening the safeguards against misuse of INTERPOL’s notice system. The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), an independent oversight body, reviews requests for deletion of data from INTERPOL databases and assesses whether notices comply with the organization’s rules and constitution. The CCF’s capacity has been expanded in response to the growing volume of complaints, and procedural reforms have introduced more rigorous review of notices originating from countries with records of political misuse. Nevertheless, critics argue that the reforms are insufficient and that INTERPOL’s institutional culture prioritizes operational cooperation over human rights scrutiny, creating risks that the organization’s tools will be weaponized against individuals who pose no legitimate criminal justice interest (Fair Trials International, 2018).

The election of INTERPOL presidents from countries with poor human rights records—including a controversial candidacy by a Russian official—has highlighted the tension between the organization’s universal membership and the democratic values that many of its member states espouse. These controversies reflect a broader challenge facing all international organizations that include both democratic and authoritarian members: how to maintain the benefits of universal participation while preventing the institutional tools designed for legitimate law enforcement from being co-opted for political repression (Deflem, 2006).

Databases and Information Systems

The INTERPOL Information System (I-24/7)

INTERPOL’s secure communications network—known as I-24/7—connects NCBs and authorized law enforcement agencies in all 195 member countries, enabling real-time access to INTERPOL’s databases and the exchange of police information across borders. I-24/7 provides the technological backbone for INTERPOL’s operational activities, allowing border control officers to check travelers’ documents against INTERPOL databases, investigators to query criminal records and biometric data across jurisdictions, and NCBs to exchange operational messages and intelligence in a secure environment (INTERPOL, 2023).

The databases accessible through I-24/7 represent one of INTERPOL’s most valuable contributions to global law enforcement. The Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database contains records of more than 100 million travel documents reported as stolen or lost by member countries, enabling border control officers to identify individuals traveling on fraudulent or compromised documents. The database was searched more than 1.5 billion times in 2022, demonstrating the scale of its integration into national border security operations. The SLTD database gained particular prominence after the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 in 2014, when it was revealed that two passengers had boarded the aircraft using passports recorded in the database—an incident that prompted calls for more consistent use of the database by airlines and border agencies worldwide (INTERPOL, 2023).

Additional INTERPOL databases cover stolen vehicles, stolen works of art, fingerprints, DNA profiles, facial recognition data, child sexual exploitation material, and firearms. The biometric databases—fingerprint, facial recognition, and DNA—have expanded rapidly as member countries have invested in biometric identification technology, and they are increasingly used for both criminal investigation and border security purposes. The integration of biometric data from diverse national systems raises technical challenges related to data quality, interoperability, and the standardization of collection and analysis protocols, as well as privacy concerns about the accumulation of biometric data in a centralized international repository (Deflem, 2006).

The Notices System

INTERPOL’s color-coded notices system provides a standardized mechanism for communicating requests for cooperation among member countries. Red Notices—the most widely known—request the provisional arrest of a wanted person with a view to extradition. Blue Notices request the collection of additional information about a person’s identity, location, or criminal activities. Yellow Notices alert police to missing persons. Black Notices seek information on unidentified bodies. Green Notices warn about persons considered to be a danger to public safety. Orange Notices warn about events, objects, or practices that pose a threat to public safety. Purple Notices seek information on modus operandi, objects, devices, or concealment methods used by criminals. The INTERPOL–United Nations Security Council Special Notice identifies individuals and entities subject to UN sanctions (INTERPOL, 2023).

Red Notices have become the most operationally significant tool in INTERPOL’s repertoire, functioning as an international alert that enables the location and provisional arrest of fugitives across borders. More than 15,000 Red Notices were in circulation in 2022, and the system has contributed to the arrest of thousands of fugitives worldwide, including high-profile targets such as cartel leaders, war crimes suspects, and fugitive financiers. However, Red Notices are not international arrest warrants—they carry no legal force, and the decision to arrest a person subject to a Red Notice rests entirely with the national authorities of the country where the person is located, in accordance with that country’s domestic law (Anderson, 1989).

The misuse of Red Notices and diffusions (less formal requests circulated through the I-24/7 system) by authoritarian regimes has become one of the most contentious issues in INTERPOL governance. Documented cases include the use of Red Notices to pursue political opponents of authoritarian governments, business rivals in commercial disputes that have been dressed up as criminal matters, and refugees who have been granted asylum in third countries. Fair Trials International and other human rights organizations have campaigned for stronger safeguards, and INTERPOL has introduced reforms including mandatory legal review of Red Notice requests, a refugee protection policy that prevents notices from being used to circumvent asylum decisions, and expanded capacity for the CCF to process complaints. Despite these reforms, the tension between facilitating legitimate police cooperation and preventing political abuse remains a defining challenge for the organization (Fair Trials International, 2018).

Operational Activities

Multinational Operations

INTERPOL coordinates multinational operations that target specific crime types through joint investigative activities involving law enforcement agencies from multiple countries. These operations are typically organized around thematic priorities—drugs, people trafficking, cybercrime, financial crime, environmental crime, counterterrorism—and bring together national police forces, border agencies, and specialized units for coordinated enforcement actions over defined periods. Operations are planned and coordinated by INTERPOL’s operational directorates in Lyon and Singapore, with logistical and analytical support provided by the General Secretariat (INTERPOL, 2023).

Notable operational successes include Operation Lionfish, a series of operations targeting maritime drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Central America that have resulted in the seizure of tons of cocaine and the arrest of hundreds of suspects. Operation Pangea, conducted annually since 2008, targets the online sale of counterfeit and illicit pharmaceuticals, coordinating actions by regulatory agencies, police forces, and customs authorities in more than 100 countries. Operation Thunderstorm and related initiatives target wildlife trafficking through coordinated enforcement actions at airports, seaports, and border crossings across multiple continents. These operations demonstrate INTERPOL’s capacity to mobilize and coordinate national enforcement agencies for time-limited campaigns that achieve results exceeding what any single country could accomplish alone (Barnett & Coleman, 2005).

The effectiveness of multinational operations depends on the willingness and capacity of participating countries to commit resources, share intelligence, and act on leads generated through the coordination process. Countries with well-resourced police forces and established traditions of international cooperation tend to participate more actively and contribute more effectively than those with limited capacity or political reluctance to engage. INTERPOL’s role as coordinator rather than commander means that it can facilitate but not compel cooperation, and the outcomes of multinational operations reflect the aggregate commitment of participating countries rather than INTERPOL’s institutional capacity alone (Deflem, 2006).

Counterterrorism and Cybercrime

INTERPOL’s counterterrorism activities expanded significantly after the September 11 attacks, with the establishment of dedicated counterterrorism units and the integration of terrorism-related databases into the I-24/7 system. The INTERPOL Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre analyzes information from member countries to identify cross-border terrorist networks, track the movement of foreign terrorist fighters, and support national investigations through analytical products and operational coordination. INTERPOL maintains databases on known and suspected terrorists, foreign terrorist fighters, and stolen and fraudulent identity documents that enable border security agencies to identify and intercept individuals associated with terrorist organizations (INTERPOL, 2023).

Cybercrime represents one of the fastest-growing areas of INTERPOL activity. The INTERPOL Cybercrime Directorate, established in 2015 and based at the Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore, provides operational support, capacity building, and innovation services to member countries combating cybercrime. The Directorate coordinates multinational operations against cybercriminal networks, provides malware analysis and digital forensics support, and operates the INTERPOL Gateway for cybercrime information sharing among member countries and private sector partners. The collaboration between INTERPOL and technology companies—including through the INTERPOL Global Cybercrime Expert Group—reflects the recognition that effective cybercrime response requires public-private partnership at the international level (INTERPOL, 2023).

INTERPOL’s capacity-building programs in counterterrorism and cybercrime address the significant disparities in technical capability among member countries. Training programs, equipment provision, and operational mentoring help developing countries build the institutional capacity necessary to participate effectively in international counterterrorism and cybercrime cooperation. These programs are funded through a combination of INTERPOL’s regular budget, voluntary contributions from member states, and partnerships with international organizations including the European Union, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and bilateral donors. The sustainability of capacity building depends on the willingness of recipient countries to invest in maintaining the capabilities developed through external support—a condition that is not always met (Barnett & Coleman, 2005).

INTERPOL and Regional Organizations

Relationship with Europol and Other Bodies

INTERPOL’s global mandate overlaps with the more focused mandates of regional law enforcement organizations, particularly Europol (the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation). The relationship between INTERPOL and Europol is cooperative but sometimes competitive: both organizations facilitate police cooperation across borders, maintain databases and analytical capabilities, and coordinate multinational operations, but they operate under different governance structures, legal frameworks, and institutional cultures. Europol serves only EU member states and operates within the EU’s legal framework, including the GDPR’s data protection requirements, while INTERPOL serves a global membership under its own constitution and data protection rules (Deflem, 2006).

Cooperation agreements between INTERPOL and Europol provide for information sharing, joint operations, and coordination of activities in areas of overlapping interest. In practice, EU member states often participate in both INTERPOL and Europol activities, and investigators may use both organizations’ databases and communication channels in the same investigation. The complementary strengths of the two organizations—INTERPOL’s global reach and Europol’s deeper integration within the EU institutional framework—create opportunities for synergy that have been realized in joint operations targeting drug trafficking, people smuggling, and cybercrime.

Other regional police cooperation organizations—including ASEANAPOL (the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police), AMERIPOL (the Police Community of the Americas), and the African Police Cooperation Organization (AFRIPOL)—maintain cooperative relationships with INTERPOL and serve as vehicles for regional cooperation that complement INTERPOL’s global platform. These organizations reflect the recognition that effective police cooperation often requires regional mechanisms that address the specific crime patterns, institutional conditions, and political dynamics of particular geographic areas. INTERPOL’s regional bureaus serve as bridges between the organization’s global infrastructure and these regional cooperation mechanisms, ensuring that information flows between global and regional levels (Anderson, 1989).

Border Security and Migration

INTERPOL’s role in border security has expanded significantly as the intersection of transnational crime, terrorism, and irregular migration has become a central concern of national governments and international organizations. The SLTD database, the nominal database of known and suspected terrorists, and the smuggled and counterfeit document examination system all support border control operations that aim to prevent the movement of criminals, terrorists, and trafficking victims across international borders. INTERPOL’s I-Checkit initiative enables airlines and other private sector entities to query INTERPOL databases to verify the validity of travel documents, extending the organization’s border security reach beyond official government checkpoints (INTERPOL, 2023).

The migration dimension of INTERPOL’s work raises sensitive questions about the relationship between law enforcement cooperation and the protection of migrants’ and refugees’ rights. Critics have argued that the securitization of migration—the framing of migration as a security threat rather than a humanitarian or economic phenomenon—has influenced INTERPOL’s operational priorities in ways that may undermine the rights of asylum seekers, refugees, and irregular migrants who are fleeing persecution or seeking better lives rather than engaging in criminal activity. INTERPOL’s refugee protection policy, which prohibits the use of notices and diffusions to circumvent asylum decisions, provides a procedural safeguard, but the implementation of this policy depends on the vigilance of the CCF and the willingness of member countries to respect it (Fair Trials International, 2018).

The coordination of border security operations through INTERPOL has produced measurable results in the interception of individuals traveling on stolen or fraudulent documents, the identification of trafficking victims at border crossings, and the arrest of fugitives attempting to cross international borders. These operational successes demonstrate the value of INTERPOL’s databases and communication systems for border security purposes, while also illustrating the tension between security imperatives and the protection of individual rights that characterizes all international law enforcement cooperation in the migration context.

Challenges and Future Directions

Adapting to Evolving Criminal Threats

INTERPOL faces the continuous challenge of adapting its institutional capabilities to criminal threats that evolve more rapidly than the bureaucratic and political processes through which the organization updates its mandate and invests in new capacity. Cybercrime, cryptocurrency-enabled money laundering, deepfake-facilitated fraud, and the criminal exploitation of artificial intelligence all require technical capabilities, analytical tools, and partnerships that did not exist when INTERPOL’s current operational frameworks were established. The Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore represents the organization’s primary institutional response to technological change, housing its Cybercrime Directorate, its Innovation Centre, and partnerships with technology companies and academic institutions that keep the organization connected to developments at the frontier of criminal methodology (INTERPOL, 2023).

The expansion of INTERPOL’s mandate into areas beyond traditional policing—including border security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and pandemic-related enforcement—has raised questions about institutional overstretch and the prioritization of resources across competing demands. The organization must balance its core function of facilitating police-to-police cooperation on criminal matters with the broader security mandates that member states have assigned to it, and it must do so within budget constraints that limit its capacity to invest simultaneously in all areas. The strategic planning process through which INTERPOL identifies its priorities—currently organized around the INTERPOL Global Policing Goals framework—provides a mechanism for managing these competing demands, but the fundamental tension between ambition and resources is unlikely to be resolved without significant increases in member state contributions (Deflem, 2006).

The growing importance of data analytics, artificial intelligence, and predictive technologies in law enforcement creates both opportunities and risks for INTERPOL. AI-powered tools for facial recognition, pattern analysis, and threat assessment can enhance the organization’s analytical capabilities and improve the efficiency of its database searches and operational support. However, the deployment of these technologies raises concerns about bias, accuracy, privacy, and accountability that are amplified when they are applied across 195 countries with different legal frameworks and human rights standards. INTERPOL’s approach to AI governance—balancing innovation with responsible use—will be an important test of the organization’s capacity to maintain legitimacy while adapting to technological change (Bowling & Sheptycki, 2012).

Data Protection and Privacy

The collection, storage, and sharing of personal data across 195 member countries with vastly different data protection standards presents one of INTERPOL’s most complex governance challenges. The organization’s Rules on the Processing of Data establish principles of lawfulness, proportionality, data quality, and individual rights that govern the handling of information in INTERPOL databases. The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) provides independent oversight of data processing activities and handles requests from individuals seeking access to or deletion of their data from INTERPOL systems (Martha, 2010).

The European Union’s GDPR has created additional complexity for INTERPOL’s data processing activities involving EU member states. EU data protection authorities have scrutinized the adequacy of INTERPOL’s data protection framework, and questions have been raised about whether INTERPOL’s standards meet the requirements that the GDPR imposes on international transfers of personal data. The negotiation of data sharing agreements between INTERPOL and EU institutions requires careful attention to the compatibility of the two frameworks, and the outcome of these negotiations has implications for the flow of police information between European and non-European countries through INTERPOL channels (Fair Trials International, 2018).

The tension between data sharing for law enforcement purposes and data protection for individual rights reflects a broader challenge facing all international police cooperation mechanisms in an era of expanding digital surveillance and heightened privacy awareness. INTERPOL’s response to this challenge—strengthening its data protection framework while maintaining the operational utility of its databases—will determine whether the organization can sustain the trust of both its member countries and the individuals whose data it processes. The comparative dimension of this challenge is significant: the standards that INTERPOL establishes for international police data sharing are likely to influence the data protection practices of national police forces worldwide, making the organization’s choices about data governance consequential far beyond its own institutional boundaries.

Conclusion

INTERPOL occupies a unique position in the architecture of global law enforcement—the only organization that connects police forces in virtually every country in the world through a shared communications infrastructure, operational databases, and coordination mechanisms that enable cooperation across the full spectrum of transnational crime. Its databases, notices system, and multinational operations have contributed to the arrest of thousands of fugitives, the disruption of criminal networks, and the interception of individuals traveling on fraudulent documents, demonstrating the operational value of international police cooperation at scale.

The organization’s limitations are equally significant. INTERPOL has no enforcement powers of its own and depends entirely on the willingness of sovereign states to share information and act on requests. Its universal membership, while essential for its global reach, creates governance challenges when authoritarian regimes misuse its tools for political purposes. Its budget is modest relative to the scale and complexity of the transnational crime threats it is mandated to address, and the disparities in capacity among its member countries mean that the organization’s effectiveness is constrained by the weakest links in the global law enforcement chain.

The future of INTERPOL will be shaped by its capacity to maintain the trust of its member countries while strengthening the safeguards against misuse, to invest in the technological infrastructure necessary to keep pace with rapidly evolving criminal methodologies, and to bridge the capacity gap between developed and developing countries that limits the effectiveness of global police cooperation. The comparative study of international law enforcement cooperation demonstrates that INTERPOL’s contribution is indispensable but insufficient—that effective responses to transnational crime require not only the police-to-police cooperation that INTERPOL facilitates but also judicial cooperation, regulatory harmonization, and the broader governance reforms that address the institutional conditions enabling transnational criminal activity.

References

Anderson, M. (1989). Policing the world: Interpol and the politics of international police co-operation. Clarendon Press.
Andreas, P., & Nadelmann, E. (2006). Policing the globe: Criminalization and crime control in international relations. Oxford University Press.
Barnett, M. N., & Coleman, L. (2005). Designing police: Interpol and the study of change in international organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 49(4), 593–619.
Bayer, M. D. (2010). The blue planet: Informal international police networks and national intelligence. National Defense Intelligence College.
Block, L. (2008). Combating organized crime in Europe: Practicalities of police cooperation. Policing, 2(1), 74–81.
Bowling, B., & Sheptycki, J. (2012). Global policing. SAGE.
Deflem, M. (2002). Policing world society: Historical foundations of international police cooperation. Oxford University Press.
Deflem, M. (2006). Global rule of law or global rule of law enforcement? International police cooperation and counterterrorism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 603(1), 240–251.
Europol. (2023). Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2023. Europol.
Fair Trials International. (2018). Strengthening respect for human rights, strengthening INTERPOL. Fair Trials.
Fijnaut, C. (2004). Police cooperation and the area of freedom, security, and justice. In N. Walker (Ed.), Europe’s area of freedom, security, and justice (pp. 241–282). Oxford University Press.
Gerspacher, N. (2008). The history of international police cooperation. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(2), 184–190.
Gerspacher, N., & Dupont, B. (2007). The nodal structure of international police cooperation: An exploration of transnational security networks. Global Governance, 13(3), 347–364.
INTERPOL. (2023). Annual Report 2022. International Criminal Police Organization.
Joutsen, M. (2006). International instruments on cooperation in responding to transnational crime. In P. Reichel (Ed.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (pp. 316–347). SAGE.
Lemieux, F. (Ed.). (2010). International police cooperation: Emerging issues, theory, and practice. Willan Publishing.
Martha, R. S. J. (2010). The legal foundations of INTERPOL. Hart Publishing.
Nadelmann, E. A. (1993). Cops across borders: The internationalization of U.S. criminal law enforcement. Pennsylvania State University Press.
Savona, E. U. (2010). Bentham’s theory of legislation and international cooperation against transnational crime. In P. Reichel & J. Albanese (Eds.), Handbook of transnational crime and justice (2nd ed., pp. 349–368). SAGE.
Sheptycki, J. (2002). In search of transnational policing. Ashgate.
Walker, N. (Ed.). (2004). Europe’s area of freedom, security, and justice. Oxford University Press.
Williams, P. (2001). Transnational criminal networks. In J. Arquilla & D. Ronfeldt (Eds.), Networks and netwars (pp. 61–97). RAND Corporation.
Goldsmith, A., & Sheptycki, J. (2007). Crafting transnational policing. Hart Publishing.
Cockayne, J. (2016). Hidden power: The strategic logic of organized crime. Oxford University Press.
Loader, I. (2002). Policing, securitization, and democratization in Europe. Criminal Justice, 2(2), 125–153.
Bayley, D. H. (2006). Changing the guard: Developing democratic police abroad. Oxford University Press.
Mitsilegas, V. (2009). EU criminal law. Hart Publishing.
den Boer, M. (2010). Towards a governance model of police cooperation in Europe. Policing, 4(4), 353–361.
Aden, H. (2001). Convergence of policing policies and transnational policing in Europe. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 9(2), 99–112.
Klosek, J. (2000). The development of international police cooperation within the EU. Kluwer Law International.

Related Articles